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fine distinction made in the case of McDermott v. Burke15 where
the intervening cause, once the child was attracted on to the
premises by the pile of sand, was the child's act in resting his
hand on the rope which ran over the sheave and the starting of
which, injured him; and possibly, too, this distinction is to be found
in the principal case, if the court is impelled to the conclusion that
the attraction was the spoil bank and not the canal and that the
child must have run down from the spoil bank to the canal wall,
but how does that account for the language of the Follett case,
as that the attractive nuisance need not be visible from the street,
and the result reached in the Anthony case, where the pond or
water did not have floating logs in it?
In the case of Ransay v. Tuthill Material Ca.,16 the court
pointed to the fact that all the conditions together there made the
attractive nuisance and that it was not necessary that the dangerous
thing be visible from the street or that children should have been
attracted to the premises by it. Is it stretching the application
of the principle too far to say that in the principal case, while the
unfinished canal, as such or the spoil bank, or the incline to the
wall of the canal, or the wall itself with its four-foot wide top, each
of itself, would not be an attractive nuisance, yet together, they
might be ?
It is feared that the case serves rather to heighten the con-
fusion already existing in the law on the subject rather than to
clarify the situation.
Even in a turn-table case, it was held by an Appellate court
decision that where the child was injured when he went to the
turn-table for the purpose of helping the men operating it, and not
to satisfy his childish curiosity or childish instinct to play with
it, he was not attracted by it as a nuisance.' 7  In one Appellate
court case, a cistern filled with water covered by a wooden cover
with a handle was held to be an attractive nuisance ;"' an elevator
in a building has been held to be such by the Supreme Court19
and an endless chain coal conveyor 2 and lumber piled on a side-
walk; 2 1 but a wagon and a team of horses was held not to be.22
ELMER M. LEESMAN.
WILLS-CAPACITY TO REVO1E-BURDEN OF PROoF.-[Missis-
sippi] A case' recently decided by the Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi presents an interesting and somewhat novel problem in the
burden of proof as to a testator's capacity to revoke his will.
The question arose on a bill in equity to establish and probate
15. 256 II 401.
16. 295 Ill. 396.
17. Belt Ry. Co. v. Charters 123 I11. App. 322, 328.
18. Donk Bros. Coal Co. v. Leavitt 109 Il1. App. 385, 386.
19. Siddall v. Jansen. 168 Ili. 46.
20. Stollery v. Cicero Street Ry. Co. 243 Il. 291.
21. True & True Co. v. Woda 201 I1. 319.
22. Scott v. Peabody Coal Co. 153 111. App. 107.
1. Watkins v. Watkins (1926) 106 So. 753.
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an alleged lost will. In 1918 the testator made a will whose validity
was not disputed.
The evidence showed that it remained in the possession of the
testator, and was in existence as late at 1922, but could not be
found at the time of his death some months later.
To meet the presumption arising under these conditions that
the will had been destroyed by the testator animo revocandi, the pro-
ponents introduced evidence tending to show that the testator became
mentally incompetent in 1921, while the will was still in existence,
and continued in that condition until his death.
The contestants introduced a large amount of evidence contro-
verting such incompetency. The chancellor submitted the issue
of revocation to a jury which found for the proponents; a decree
was accordingly entered establishing the will, from which the
contestants appealed.
In the Supreme Court the controversy was disposed of on the
following basis:
"There then remains for consideration the question as to whether
the issue of revocation of the will at a time when the testator was men-
tally capacitated to revoke the same was properly submitted to the
jury. The evidence discloses that a very diligent search for this will
was made, and that it could not be found, and, where a will is traced
to the possession of the testator and can not be found after his death,
the presumption arises that he destroyed it animo revocandi, but this
presumption may be overcome by proof that the will was in existence
at a time when the testator was mentally incapacitated to revoke the
same and that he never thereafter became mentally capacitated to revoke
it. 3 Alexander on Wills, p. 2012; Tucker v. Whitehead, 59 Miss. 594.
The degree of mentality required to revoke a will is the same as that
required to make one . . . and in the case at bar the burden of
proof rested upon the proponents to show that the testator, at no tine
after the will was last shown to have been in existence, ever possessed
mental capacity to revoke a will.
"The conflicts in the testimony, however, were for the jury to
pass upon, and, although we may not be entirely satisfied with their
findings, we can not invade their province by setting aside this verdict
which has been approved by the chancellor."
It is not clear which burden of proof the court is talking about,
whether it is the burden of producing evidence to meet the pre-
sumption, so as to make a question for the jury, or whether it is
the ultimate burden of convincing the jury by a preponderance of
the evidence of the truth of the proposition that the testator lacked
sufficient capacity to revoke the will. If the court merely meant to
say that at a particular stage of the case there was a burden on the
proponent to produce sufficient evidence of lack of capacity to make
a question for the jury, the statement is sound and hardly calls for
comment.
It was apparently conceded that the will remained in the testa-
tor's possession and that it could not be found after his death.
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These facts gave rise to the familiar presumption of destruction by
the testator animo revocandi. 2
Of course, destruction of his will by a testator while insane
or lacking proper mental capacity would not work a revocation."
But there is a general presumption of sanity,4 which would
make it unnecessary to produce evidence of sanity in the first in-
stance.
The effect of these two presumptions would obviously entitle
the contestants to a directed verdict on the issue of revocation if no
other evidence had been introduced, without regard to which side
had the ultimate burden on the issue of capacity in case that ques-
tion were submitted to the jury.
It seems more probable, however, that the court had in mind
the ultimate burden of convincing the jury of the lack of capacity.5
Assuming that the court's statement should be understood as
placing on the proponents the burden of establishing lack of capacity
to revoke, the question presented is one of considerable doubt and
difficulty.
It can not be settled by precedent because of the lack of adjudi-
cated cases where the point has really been determined.
It can not be settled by mere logic, any more than the burden
of proof as to capacity to make a will. On the latter point, it is
well settled in England that the burden is on the proponents to
establish to the satisfaction of the jury that the testator possessed
the necessary mental capacity.6
This result was reached in the Sutton case on the following
reasoning:
"Now, he who relies on a will in opposition to the title of the
heir at law, must allege that it is a will of a person of sound and
disposing mind: he must therefore prove it. . . . The onus re-
mains on him throughout, and the court or jury who have to decide
the question in dispute must decide upon the whole of the evidence
so given; and if it does not satisfy them that the will is valid, they
ought to pronounce against it."
2. Whiteley v. King (1864) 17 C. B. (N. s.) 756; Sugden v. St.
Leonards (1876) L. R. 1 P. D. 154; Leemon v. Leighton (1925) 314 Il1. 407;
Srith v. Smnitht 138 N. E. 539 (Mass.); McMurtry v, Kopke 250 S. W. 399
(Mo.); Wendt v. Ziegenhagen (1912) 148 Wis. 382.
3. Brunt v. Brunt L. R. 3 P. & D. 37; Rich v. Gilkey 73 Me. 595; In re
Goldsticker 192 N. Y. 35; Shacklett v. Roller 97 Va. 639.
4. Davis v. U. S. (1895) 160 U. S. 469; Baxter v. Abbott (1856) 7
Gray 71.
5. If the ultimate burden was on the contestants to establish revocation,
including capacity to revoke, a verdict for the proponents would not neces-
sarily mean anything more than that the jury were not affirmatively con-
vinced of the testator's capacity. And hence, as there was substantial evi-
dence both ways, a verdict against the party having the burden would hardly
call for an extensive review of the evidence.
Whereas if the burden of establishing lack of capacity to revoke was on
the proponents, a verdict in their favor was an affirmative finding on that
proposition which would naturally call for a review of the evidence in a
chancery case, though the court might be unwilling to disturb a verdict
approved by the chancellor, if not manifestly wrong.
6. Sutton v. Sadler (1857) 3 C. B. (x. s.) 87.
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Since the action in that case was ejectment, and the plea the
general issue, the court's statement that the party relying on a will
must allege that it is the will of a person of sound and disposing
mind, etc., can only mean that one who relies on a will impliedly
asserts the capacity of the testator because capacity is essential to
testamentary intent.
The same logic would place the burden on the prosecution to
establish the capacity of a defendant in a criminal case, since capacity
is equally essential to criminal intent. But as a matter of fact the
English courts place the burden of establishing insanity or lack of
capacity in a criminal case on the defendant.7
The Supreme Court of the United States on the other hand
has taken the contrary view and placed the burden of establishing
criminal capacity on the prosecution.8
The reasoning of the Davis case is this:
"It [the plea of not guilty] is not in confession and avoidance, for
it is a plea that contradicts the existence of every fact essential to
constitute the crime charged. . . . And his guilt can not in the
very nature of things be regarded as proved, if the jury entertain a
reasonable doubt from all the evidence whether he was legally capable
of committing the crime."
This logic would place the burden of establishing capacity on
the proponent in the will cases.
But notwithstanding logic the Supreme Court places the bur-
dent on the contestants to establish lack of capacity.9 In the Davis
case the presumption of sanity is treated as merely relieving the
prosecution of the burden of producing evidence of capacity in the
first instance.
In the Brosnan case the presumption of sanity is invoked to
place the burden of establishing lack of capacity on the contestant.
The apparent inconsistency of each court in dealing with the
problem of capacity to make a will and capacity to commit a crime
is obvious.
The explanation of the English rule in the wills cases, which
is followed in many of the American states, seems to be that the
court, consciously or unconsciously, felt that it was unfair that
the heir should be deprived of his inheritance where the capacity of
the testator was doubtful. Accordingly, a logical basis was formu-
lated for the desired result, i. e., that capacity was a necessary ele-
7. Reg. v. McNaughton (1843) 10 Cl. & F. 200.
8. Davis v. United Stales (1895) 160 U. S. 469.
9. Brosnan v. Brosnan (1923) 263 U. S. 345.
In this case it was said by Mr. Justice Sandford:
"And viewed from a practical rather than an academic standpoint [the
burden on the contestant] gives effective weight to the presumption of the
testator's sanity and obviates the difficulty which would arise if such pre-
sumption were treated as one which merely establishes a prima facie case
in favor of the proponent of the will but did not relieve him of the ultimate
burden of persuasion on the question of the testator's mental capacity."
This simply means that for various reasons the court thought that the
contestant ought to bear the risk of non-persuasion.
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ment in the making of a will, and therefore the proponent must
prove it. In the criminal cases the English court felt, consciously
or unconsciously, that it would be too easy to cheat the gallows by
mere doubts of capacity, and hence a different rule of presumption
was evolved to place the burden where the court thought it ought to
be."0
The natural reaction of the Supreme Court of the United States
was exactly the reverse in each class of cases.
It instinctively felt that it was unfair to hang a man whose
capacity was doubtful, and the burden accordingly was placed on
the prosecution to exclude the doubt.
But the court lacked the English consideration for the heir.
It felt rather that the testator, who had accumulated the property,
was entitled to dispose of it as he pleased. and should not be balked
of his desires unless his lack of capacity was clear. Accordingly
the desired result was accomplished, and the presumption was in-
voked to furnish a plausible justification. There is no magic about
presumptions. They merely call on the party against whom they
operate to produce evidence to make a question for the jury. When
another rule is added placing the risk of non-persuasion the real
explanation is policy.
Many other illustrations might be given where policy has much
more to do with placing the burden of proof than logic.
In that disfavored action of malicious prosecution the plaintiff
was loaded with the almost impossible burden of establishing the
negative, that there was no probable cause.11
In libel and slander, by all logic, the burden ought to be on the
plaintiff to establish the falsity of the accusation, since we think of
libel or slander as a false imputation, but the difficulty of establish-
ing a blameless life, together with an instinctive feeling that the
defamer ought to make good his charge, otherwise there would be
little check on slander, has resulted in the universally accepted rule
that the defendant must plead and prove truth as a justification.' 2
There is also the well known hopeless conflict in opinion in
negligence cases as to whether the defendant must establish con-
tributory negligence or the plaintiff must establish the absence of
fault on his part. The reasoning of Brett, Master of the Rolls.in
the Wakelin"3 case, that the plaintiff must prove freedom from con-
tributory negligence because there would be no liability if the plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence, proves too much, for it
would saddle the plaintiff with the burden of excluding all possible
defenses, except matter operating to destroy or discharge an existing
liability.
Courts which place the burden on the defendant found suffi-
cient justification in the pleadings. The declaration was not re-
10. State v. Klinger (1868) 43 Mo. 127.
11. Abrath v. North Eastern Ry. Co. (1883) L. R. 11 Q. B. D. 440.
12. Smith v. Richardson (1737) Willes 20; Thomas v. Dunaway (1863)
30 Ill. 373.
13. Wakelin v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co. (1886) 55 L. T. R. 709.
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quired to allege the absence of contributory negligence,'1 4 hence proof
of contributory negligence must be an affirmative defense to be
established by the defendant.
It seems likely that the courts which placed the burden on the
plaintiff were unconsciously moved to that course by the fact that
juries were hostile to the defense and frequently ignored what the
court regarded as a clear showing of contributory fault.15
These illustrations ought to make it sufficiently clear that in
the debatable cases policy is a stronger factor than logic in appor-
tioning the burden of proof.
Returning to the problem in hand, where revocation of a will
by some subsequent writing has been involved the courts have quite
generally placed the burden of proving the execution of the revo-
catory writing on the contestant.16 This seems in accordance with
the general analogies. Where the heir is favored by placing the
burden on the proponent to prove the capacity of the testator, the
policy favoring the heir is not carried to the extreme of forcing the
proponent to establish the absence of undue influence. That burden
is almost universally placed on the contesting heir.'7
In states where the contestant is thought of as attacking an
existing will, he must establish the grounds of his attack, whether
it is lack of capacity,, 8 undue influence, 9 or revocation.2 0  If such
a revocation case further involved the question of capacity to re-
voke, it is probable that the courts would follow the analogy sug-
gested by capacity to make a will, especially if in the course of time
the original policy of that rule had been lost sight of, and the rule
itself had become settled on familiar conventional reasoning. In
that case courts, which place the burden on proponent to establish
the capacity of the testator to make a will because he impliedly
alleges capacity, by the same process could naturally place the bur-
den of establishing capacity to revoke on the contestant because he
relies on revocation and thereby impliedly asserts capacity. While
14. Thompson v. Ry. (1873) 51 Mo. 190.
In Illinois and a few other states the declaration is required to negative
contributory negligence; Chicago Ry. v. Cooney (1902) 196 Ill. 466.
15. Williams, J. in Toomey v. Ry. (1857) 3 C. B. (w. s.) 146:
"It is not enough to say that there is some evidence; for, every person
who has had experience in courts of justice knows very well that a case of
this sort against a railway company could only be submitted to a jury with
one result."
16. Webster v. Yorty (1902) 194 I1. 408; Giles v. Giles (1910) 204 Mass.
383. In re Shelton's Will (1906) 143 N. C. 218.
17. Boyce v. Rossborough (18573 6 H. L. C. 2; Baldwizn v. Parker (1868)
99 Mass. 78; Campbell v. Carlisle (1901) 162 Mo. 634; but see Sheehan v.
Kearney (1903) 82 Miss. 688, placing the burden of establishing the absence
of undue influence on the proponent because he asserts that it is the tes-
tator's will, and this assertion is not true if it was not the testator's voluntary
act.
18. Donovan v. St. Joseph Home (1920) 295 Ill. 125.
19. Michael v. Marshall (1903) 201 Ill. 70. In re Kindberg (1912) 207
N. Y. 220.
20. Behrens v. Behrens (1890) 47 Ohio St. 323; Webster v. Yorty (1902)
194 Ill. 408.
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courts, which place the burden on contestant to establish lack of
capacity to make a will because he must overcome the presumption
of capacity, 2' by a like process would naturally place the burden
of establishing lack of capacity to revoke on the proponent because
he encounters the same presumption of capacity now operating in
favor of the contestant. On analogy alone the Supreme Court of
Mississippi should have placed the burden on contestant to estab-
lish capacity to revoke, since it follows the English rule in placing
the burden on the proponent to establish capacity to make a will,22
unless the missing will, presumably destroyed by the testator pre-
sents such a different problem as to make the analogies inapplicable.
By implication the Court of Appeals of Virginia placed the burden
on proponent, seeking to probate a lost will, to establish lack of
capacity to revoke,23 though that court also follows the rule placing
the burden on the proponent to establish the capacity of the testator
to make a will.
2 4
The facts in the Shacklett case are much like those in the
Watkin case. The will could not be found after the testator's
death, and there was evidence of the impairment of his mind. The
lower court admitted the lost will to probate, but the decree was
reversed because the evidence did not satisfactorily establish that the
will was in existence after the testator became mentally incompetent.
In other words, assuming that the testator destroyed the will
according to the usual presumption, the evidence did not establish
that he la:ked capacity, because the time of the destruction was un-
known. The reason assigned by the court was:
"It is not sufficient in a case like this to show that the will may
have been in existence after the testator's mind had-become so im-
paired that he could not revoke it; but it must appear that it was
in existence after that time. Courts of equity do not set up lost
papers except where it is clearly shown that it should be done."
The case is not squarely in point because it may -be said that
the presumption of sanity at the time of destruction is not shaken
by proof of lack of capacity toward the end of the testator's life
when the destruction might have taken place. But the implication
is fairly clear that in the lost will cases the proponent is to bear
the risk of non-persuasion of lack of capacity to revoke.
It is not a serious objection to this view that it is more or less
inconsistent with the rule placing the burden on proponent to estab-
lish testator's capacity to make the will, for the courts are consis-
tently inconsistent in dealing with the burden of proof. And this
is as it should be, because in judicial legislation desirable results
are the object rather than a symmetrical system.
To the instinctive, rather than reasoned, reaction of the court
that a presumably revoked will should not be probated unless it was
21. Egbers v. Egbers (1892) 177 Ill. 82; Donovan v. St. Joseph Home(1920) 295 Ill. 125.
22. Sheehan v. Kearney (1903) 82 Miss. 688.
23. Shacklett v. Roller (1899) 97 Va. 639.
24. Gray v. Rumnrill (1903) 101 Va. 507.
COMMENT ON RECENT CASES 69
clear that the revocation was not effective, a practical objection may
be urged, that it does not adequately protect a testator, whose capac-
ity has become doubtful because of age or disease, from an acci-
dental destruction of his will, or from its spoilation by interested
persons. 25
The contrary tendency was shown by the English court of
probate in the Sogden-St. Leonards2 case, where it stretched the
hearsay rule to the breaking point in order to establish the contents
of a missing will. E. W. HINTON.
25. The difficulty of rebutting the presumption of destruction by the
testator is great, since it is not sufficient to show that those interested in the
destruction of the will had the opportunity, Gavit v. Moulton (1903) 119
Wis. 35.
26. (1876) L. R. 1. Pro. Div. 154.
